The trolley problem is a thought experiment in ethics, first introduced by Philippa Foot, but also extensively analysed by Judith Jarvis Thomson and, more recently, by Peter Unger.
Table of contents |
2 Related problems 3 Footnotes 4 References 5 Related topics |
The problem is this:
Of course, a simple utilitarian calculation will justify this course of action, but non-utilitarians also usually want to say that flipping the switch is acceptable.
The initial trolley problem becomes interesting when it is compared to other moral dilemmas.
One such is that offered by J. J. Thomson:
One clear distinction is that in the first case, one does not intend harm towards anyone - harming the one is just a side-effect of switching the trolley away from the five. However, in the second case, harming the one is an integral part of the plan to save the five. [1]
So, some claim that the difference between the two cases is that in the second, you intend someone's death to save the five, and this is wrong, whereas in the first, you have no such intention. This solution is essentially an application of the doctrine of double effect, which says that you may take action which has bad side-effects, but deliberately intending harm (even for good causes) is wrong.
On the other hand, Thomson argues that an essential difference between the original trolley problem and this version with the fat man, is that in the first case, you merely deflect the harm, whereas in the second case, you have to do something to the fat man to save the five. Thomson says that in the first case, nobody has any more right than anyone else not to be run over, but in the second case, the fat man has a right not to be pushed in front of the trolley.
Utilitarians, of course, deny this. But so do some non-utilitarians such as Peter Unger, who rejects that it can make a substantive moral difference whether you bring the harm to the one or whether you move the one into the path of the harm.
The claim that it is wrong to use the death of one to save five runs into a problem with "loop" variants like this:
Unger argues extensively against traditional non-utilitarian responses to trolley problems. This is one of his examples:
Unger therefore argues that different responses to these sorts of problems are based more on psychology than ethics - in this new case, he says, the only important difference is that the man in the yard does not seem particularly "involved". Unger claims that people therefore believe the man is not "fair game", but says that this involvedness cannot make a moral difference.
The trolley problem
Almost all philosophers agree that it is permissible to flip the switch. The stronger claim, that it is also required, is less often made.Related problems
The fat man
Resistance to this course of action seems strong; most people who approved of sacrificing one to save five in the first case do not approve in the second sort of case. This has led to attempts to find a relevant moral distinction between the two cases.The track that loops back
The only difference between this case and the original trolley problem is that an extra piece of track has been added, which seems a trivial difference (especially since the trolley won't travel down it anyway). So intuition may suggest that the answer should be the same as the original trolley problem - one may flip the switch. However, in this case, the death of the one actually is part of the plan to save the five.The man in the yard
Responses to this are partly dependant on whether the reader has already encountered the standard trolley problem (since there is a desire to keep one's responses consistent), but Unger notes that people who have not encountered such problems before are quite likely to say that, in this case, the proposed action would be wrong.Footnotes
References
Related topics