Main Page | See live article | Alphabetical index Algemene Inlichtingen en Veiligheidsdienst (AIVD), formerly known as the BVD (Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst) is the General Intelligence and Security Office of the Netherlands. Table of contents 1 About this information 2 Mission 3 Oversight and Accountability 4 Activities 5 Methods and authorities 6 Criticism 7 Influence and results 8 External link About this information Since the AIVD is a secret service it is hard to verify information contained on this page. The AIVD's website (including its yearly reports), and occasional answers to questions in parliament are the only official sources of information available. The following is further based on media reports. Mission The AIVD focussus mostly on non-military threats to Dutch National security, whereas the Military Intelligence and Security Office (MIVD) focussus on international threats, specifically military and government-sponsored threats such as espionage. The AIVD, unlike its predecessor BVD, is charged with collecting intelligence and assisting in combatting both domestic and foreign threats to national security. Oversight and Accountability The minister of internal affairs (and relations within the realm) is politically responsible for the AIVD's actions. Oversight is provided by the Intelligence Committee of parliament, comprising the speakers for the biggest four parties in the second chamber of parliament (cf. Congress, Commons), and by an Oversight Committee with members appointed by parliament. The AIVD publishes a yearly report which includes its budget. The published version contains omissions where information is deemed sensitive. The AIVD can be forced by the courts to publish any records held on a private citizen, but it may keep secret information that is relevant to current cases. No information that is less than five years old will be provided under any circumstance to private citizens about their records. Activities Its main activities include; monitoring specific groups, such as leftist activists, islamic groups, and right-wing extremists sourcing intelligence to and from foreign and domestic intelligence services performing background checks on individuals employed in "positions of trust", specifically public office, and higher-up or privileged positions in industry (such as telecommunications, banks, the largest companies) -- this ironically includes members of parliamentary oversight committees investigating incidents such as (terrorist) bombings and threats giving advice and warning about risks to national security, including advising on the protection of political figureheads Methods and authorities Its methods and authorities include telephone and internet taps authorized by the minister of internal affairs (as opposed to a court order) infiltration (rarely by employees of the service, but rather by outsiders who would have easy access to a particular group) the use of informants (existing members of groups that are recruted) open sources intelligence unfettered access to police intelligence the use of foreign intelligence service liasons (such as CIA personell) that reside in the Netherlands under a diplomatic status (including full diplomatic immunity) to collect intelligence in excess of the AIVD's authority The latter is technically the same as sourcing intelligence from a foreign intelligence service; this method has not been confirmed, conversely however, Dutch citizens have been extradited to the US on the basis of evidence provided by diplomats. Since the US constitution does not apply in The Netherlands, but long arm statutes do, these agents were unconcerned with whether their activities constituted entrapment. The AIVD operates in tight concert with the Regional Intelligence Service (Regionale Inlichtingen Dienst, RID), to which members of the police are appointed in every police district. It also co-operates with over one hundred intelligence services, including the CIA. Given the small size of the Netherlands, the latter co-operation is not likely to be symmetrical. Criticism Recently the service has been critized for not having enough focus and intelligence on islamic groups, particularly following September 11th not having enough focus and intelligence on political violence or environmental groups, particularly following the murder of Pim Fortuyn investigating familymembers of the Queen, that had had a family rift (Princess Margarita and Edwin De Roy van Zuydewijn) though this was not ordered by the minister of internal affairs, but rather by the Queen's office In the Cold War the BVD had a reputation for interviewing potential employers of persons they deemed suspicious for any reason, thereby scaring off corporations from employing these persons. Reasons for being suspect included leftist ideals, membership of the Dutch Communist Party or even a spotty military record (such as refusal to serve as a conscript). Influence and results Before September 11th the Netherlands had the largest absolute number of wiretaps in the world, more even than the US (although international calls to and from the US never needed any court order to be intercepted and were not included in the figures). To this day it is a widely held belief that requests for wiretaps by the AIVD are always granted. The service's focus on leftist activism is legendary; leftist activists exhibit great measures of paranoia relating to the service's activities, whether real or imaginary. This focues on leftist, rather than right-wing or islamic organizations is a legacy from the Cold War and historical threats posed by the Red Army Faction and such. Public opinion, however, regards the AIVD as largely ineffectual, whereas paranoiacs respond to this with "that's what they want you to belief!". Part of the service's effectiveness is the atmosphere of mistrust it inspires amongst activists. It is likely that the AIVD has significant influence in police and prosecution circles, given recent cases where suspected terrorists were prosecuted (and found not guilty) or successfully extradited (Mullah Krekar) without credible non-secret evidence. External link Official website Buro Jansen & Janssen This article is from Wikipedia. All text is available under the terms of the GNU Free Documentation License.